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INTRODUCTION
On October 21, 2013, Justice Dikgang Moseneke of the
Republic of South Africa was invited by the Leitner Center for
International Law and Justice (the “Leitner Center”) 1 at
* All history and analysis herein are that of Conor Colasurdo and Rebecca Marlin,
members of the Executive Editorial Board (the “Board”) of the Fordham International
Law Journal. Only direct quotes of Justice Moseneke may be attributed to him. The
suggested citation for this interview is: Conor Colasurdo & Rebecca Marlin, Fordham
Int’l Law Journal, South Africa’s Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Path to Democracy: An
Annotated Interview with Dikgang Moseneke, Acting Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court of
South Africa, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 279 (2014). When citing or quoting to the direct
language used by Justice Moseneke, the suggested citation is: Conor Colasurdo &
Rebecca Marlin, Fordham Int’l Law Journal, South Africa’s Constitutional Jurisprudence
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Fordham University School of Law to deliver a lecture entitled
“South Africa: Transition, Democracy and the Courts,”
moderated by Gay McDougall, the Mulligan Distinguished
Visiting Professor of International Law. 2 Shortly after the
lecture, Justice Moseneke sat down with Zachary Cronin,3 Conor
Colasurdo, 4 and Rebecca Marlin, 5 members of the Executive

and the Path to Democracy: An Annotated Interview with Dikgang Moseneke, Acting Chief
Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 279, ___ (2014)
(quoting Justice Dikgang Moseneke). Mr. Colasurdo and Ms. Marlin would like to
thank Christine Calabrese, John Keating, Ian King, and Jennifer Li, for their assistance
transcribing this interview, and Zachary Cronin and Kieran Murphy for their editorial
expertise.
1. The Leitner Center for International Law and Justice (the “Leitner Center”)
was founded in September 2007 as a natural extension of the Crowley Program in
International Human Rights (the “Crowley Program”) at Fordham University School of
Law. The Leitner Center and the Crowley Program remain two of the preeminent
programs for fieldwork-centered human rights scholarship and education. The Board
thanks the Leitner Center for their assistance in securing this interview, as well as their
dedication and devotion to the promotion of international law and justice. For more
information, see LEITNER CTR. FOR INT’L LAW & JUSTICE AT FORDHAM UNIV.,
http://www.leitnercenter.org (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
2. Professor Gay McDougall holds a B.A. from Bennington College, a J.D. from
Yale University, and an LL.M. in Public International Law from the London School of
Economics and Political Science. Professor McDougall was the Executive Director of
Global Rights at Partners for Justice from 1994 to 2006. In 2005, she was named the
first UN Independent Expert on Minority Issues. During the apartheid era in South
Africa, Professor McDougall served as the Director of the Southern African Project of
the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. In that capacity, she participated
in the defense of thousands of political prisoners. In 1994, Professor McDougall served
as an international member of the South African Independent Electoral Commission,
which administered the nation’s first non-racial elections. The Board thanks Professor
McDougall for her assistance in securing this interview, and for her exemplary work in
the field of civil rights.
3. Zachary Cronin holds a B.A. in Politics and Economics from New York
University, and expects to receive a J.D. from Fordham University School of Law in May
2014. Mr. Cronin serves as the Editor-in-Chief of Volume 37 of the Fordham
International Law Journal.
4 . Conor Colasurdo holds a B.A. in International Political Economy from
Fordham College at Rose Hill, and expects to receive a J.D. from Fordham University
School of Law in May 2014. Mr. Colasurdo serves as the Managing Editor of Volume 37
of the Fordham International Law Journal. In the summer of 2011, Mr. Colasurdo
traveled with Fordham University’s Global Outreach program to Johannesburg and
Cape Town, South Africa, where he visited the townships of Alexandra, Soweto,
Kliptown, and Khayelitsha, among others, and worked with community organizations
devoted to ameliorating the residual effects of apartheid.
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Editorial Board (the “Board”) of the Fordham International Law
Journal, for a brief interview. The transcript of that interview is
included below, annotated with background information and
commentary from the Board.
Born in Pretoria, South Africa, Justice Moseneke was
arrested at the age of fifteen for his participation in antiapartheid activism and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment on
Robben Island.6 While imprisoned, Justice Moseneke earned his
Bachelor of Arts in English and Political Science, as well as a
Baccalaureate Juris degree. He later completed Legum
Baccalaureus at the University of South Africa. In 1983, Justice
Moseneke was called to the bar as an advocate in Johannesburg
and Pretoria—in fact, he was the first Black advocate admitted to
the Pretoria bar. In 2001, he was appointed as a Judge of the
High Court in Pretoria, and, in 2002, as a Justice on the South
African Constitutional Court. Justice Moseneke was then
appointed Deputy Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court in
2005, and, in November 2013, as Acting Chief Justice during the
long-term leave of Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng.7
For years in the post-World War II era, South Africa stood
out as an “inequalitarian pluralistic society.”8 While most of the
world moved, albeit slowly, toward broader ethnic cultural
5. Rebecca Marlin holds a B.A. in Art History and French from Wellesley College,
and expects to receive a J.D. from Fordham University School of Law in May 2014. Ms.
Marlin serves as the Senior Articles Editor of Volume 37 of the Fordham International
Law Journal. In the spring of 2013, Ms. Marlin traveled to Cape Town, South Africa, as a
student of the Walter Leitner International Human Rights Clinic. There, she
interviewed sex workers and activists at the Sex Worker Education and Advocacy
Taskforce.
6. Since the beginning of the colonization of South Africa by the Dutch, and
subsequently the British, Robben Island was used primarily as a prison. See History of
Robben Island, ROBBEN ISLAND MUSEUM, http://www.robben-island.org.za/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=9&Itemid=46 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). During
apartheid, African leaders, Muslim leaders, and anti-apartheid activists, including South
Africa’s first democratically-elected president, Nelson Mandela, were imprisoned on
the island. See id.
7. See Moseneke Steps in as Chief Justice, MAIL & GUARDIAN: AFRICA’S BEST READ
(Nov. 4, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://mg.co.za/article/2013-11-04-moseneke-steps-in-asinterim-chief-justice.
8. MARTIN N. MARGER, RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES 371 (Linda Schreiber-Ganster ed., 2008).
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acceptance, the South African government legalized and
enforced the racial oppression of Blacks, Coloureds, and
Indians/Asians.9 Throughout apartheid, Whites, the numerical
minority, dominated South African society.10
The eventual end of apartheid, like many watershed
moments in history, was the culmination of at least a decade’s
worth of developments, efforts, and events.11 One event, though,
stands out in particular. On June 16, 1976, Black high school
students from the Soweto Township, outside Johannesburg,
began a peaceful demonstration12 protesting a directive of the
Bantu Education Department mandating that Afrikaans be used
9. See id. Under apartheid, the government classified each person in South Africa,
primarily based on physical appearance, as Black, Coloured, Indian/Asian, or White.
See Race in South Africa: Still an Issue, ECONOMIST (Feb. 4, 2012) http://
www.economist.com/node/21546062. Although no longer legally enforced in South
Africa, many still voluntarily identify in their respective categorizations. Id. Coloured,
an unfamiliar term to American audiences in this context, was the official
categorization of people of mixed-race backgrounds. Id. (noting that “if Barack Obama
lived in South Africa, he might be called a coloured”). Regarded as “racial misfits,” the
Coloured population was demoralized as “non-persons . . . the leftovers” by Marike de
Klerk, the first lady of South Africa from 1989 to 1994. Perhaps the most visual
representation of the arbitrary nature of apartheid policies, Coloureds range in skin
tone and are sometimes indistinguishable from the Black and White population. In
fact, in rare instances, some borderline Coloureds were reclassified after passing a
pencil-in-the-hair test, where the blackness or whiteness of a person was determined by
whether a pencil would slide out of that person’s hair. Id. (noting that curly hair that
would trap a pencil was a “supposed indicator of blackness”). The majority of
Coloureds reside in the Western Cape, and are thought to be the decedents of Dutch,
French, German, and English Settlers and their slaves of Asian and African origin. Id.
10. Despite their dominance of society, Whites in South Africa were “by no means
a culturally or even politically unified group.” MARGER, supra note 8, at 378. Over time,
the Dutch settlers in South Africa developed a culture distinct from their European
origins. Id. at 373. Such differences were most apparent in these settlers’ language of
choice: Afrikaans, a Dutch-dialect that, over generations, became only “remotely
related to the original Dutch.” Id. When the British eventually colonized South Africa,
there was great tension between the Afrikaners and the British, who were more liberal
with respect to race relations and never “coalesced into a nationlike unit” distinct from
their European origins. Id. at 374–75. Under apartheid, Afrikaners controlled the
political system, whereas the English-speaking Whites dominated the South African
economy. Id. at 378. Interestingly, the majority of the Coloured population also speaks
Afrikaans as their primary language. See id. at 379.
11. MARGER, supra note 8, at 390.
12. See Hector Pieterson Memorial and Museum, GAUTENG, http://www.gauteng.net/
attractions/entry/hector_pieterson_memorial_and_museum (last visited Feb. 12,
2014).
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to an equal extent as English as the language of instruction of
the Black population.13 The same rule had failed twenty years
previously because of a scarcity of teachers who spoke Afrikaans,
a lack of textbooks in Afrikaans, and the difficulty of instructing
students in multiple unfamiliar languages. This rule, like so
many, was part of a system “designed specifically to condition
Africans to accept the role of menials in a white man’s
country.”14 The students planned to march to the regional office
of the Department of Bantu Education to voice their opposition
to the new directive.15 On their way, the students were subjected
to a violent clash with the police. The students threw stones,
while the police fired bullets. 16 News of the violence spread
throughout the country, sparking uprisings and resulting in the
death of more than 550 people.17 One of the first to die in
Soweto was Hector Pieterson, who was only twelve years old.18
In 1983, as a last attempt to secure White rule, the State
adopted a new constitution, creating a parliament that
represented Whites, Coloureds, and Asians, yet excluded
Blacks.19 The exclusion of Blacks in this new body was one of the
factors that led to widespread violence between Blacks and the
White establishment throughout the 1980s.20 During this time,
Black political organizations such as the African National
Congress (“ANC”), led by Nelson Mandela, 21 were declared
illegal.22 By 1990, however, Prime Minister F.K. de Klerk had
13. See Down with Afrikaans, S. AFR. HIST. ONLINE, http://www.sahistory.org.za/
articles/down-afrikaans (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
14. See id.
15. See Hector Pieterson Memorial and Museum, supra note 12.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. A few blocks from where Pieterson was shot in Soweto are the Hector
Pieterson Memorial and Museum, which are dedicated to memorializing the uprising
and celebrating the role of students in ending apartheid. Id.
19. MARGER, supra note 8, at 391.
20. See id.
21. Nelson Mandela passed away on December 5, 2013, after the interview of
Justice Moseneke and during the writing of this Annotated Interview. His passing was
mourned by the world, and his legacy lives on as South Africa continues working
towards equality and freedom for all.
22. Id. at 392. While always considered a “pariah” by western countries during
apartheid, South Africa remained an important ally of the United States and Britain for
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restored the legality of the ANC and other Black political
organizations, and likewise had released Nelson Mandela from
Robben Island.23 Then, in 1994, the world bore witness to the
effects of this radical transition: the first non-racial elections in
South Africa, and the rise of Nelson Mandela as the first Black
president of the South African State.24
This transition represents a truly remarkable moment in
modern history. As Justice Moseneke has noted himself, the
world watched as South Africans “stepped back from the edge of
the cliff of violence, hatred and chaos and opted for a
negotiated transition underpinned by reconciliation, restitution
and reconstruction.”25 Instead of continued civil unrest, South
Africans chose peace. Instead of retribution, South Africans
chose truth and reconciliation.26
economic reasons. Id. at 391. In fact, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher even described
the African National Congress (“ANC”) as a “typical terrorist organization.” David
Smith, South Africans Give Mixed Response to Margaret Thatcher Death, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8,
2013, 1:22 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/apr/08/south-africamargaret-thatcher-death. President Ronald Reagan likewise placed the ANC on the US
Terror List, where it remained until 2008, under the Bush Administration. See Nelson
Mandela Removed from US Terror List, TELEGRAPH (July 2, 2008, 6:45 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/
2233256/Nelson-Mandela-removed-from-US-terror-list.html (“Today the United States
moved closer at last to removing the great shame of dishonoring this great leader by
including him on our government’s terror watch list.” (quoting then-Senator John
Kerry)).
23. MARGER, supra note 8, at 392. In 1993, the Norwegian Nobel Committee
named Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk jointly as the recipients of the Nobel Peace
Prize “for negotiating the end of the apartheid state and collaborating in the quest for
a nonracial democracy.” Bill Keller, Mandela Shares Nobel Accolade With De Klerk, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/16/world/mandela-sharesnobel-accolade-with-de-klerk.html.
24. MARGER, supra note 8, at 392.
25. Justice Dikgang Moseneke, Deputy Chief Justice of South Africa, Address at
the 62nd Annual Meeting of the American College of Trial Lawyers: A Jurisprudential
Journey from Apartheid to Democratic Constitutionalism (Oct. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/justicedikgangmoseneke/Speech-%
20American-College-of-Trial-Lawyers-19-October-2012-Dikgang-Moseneke-10-Oct-2012.
pdf.
26. During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings, Justice Moseneke
learned that he was targeted for political assassination. See Truth & Reconciliation
Comm’n, Amnesty Comm., Application in Terms of Section 18 of the Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, Paul Jacobus Janses van Vuuren
Applicant, AC/99/0032 (AM 2777/96), available at http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/
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Interestingly, this transition was born out of South Africa’s
preexisting legal institutions. The Interim Constitution, which
called for the 1994 non-racial elections, was drafted by a
technical committee on which Justice Moseneke served. Even
more surprisingly, this transitional constitution, which virtually
guaranteed the end of White-only rule, was enacted by the thenexisting White-controlled parliament.27 In accordance with this
Interim Constitution, South Africa’s then-newly elected
parliament formed a Constitutional Assembly and drafted South
Africa’s current constitution.28
The South African government proudly explains that their
Constitution is among the “most progressive . . . in the world
[and] a beacon for emerging democracies.” 29 Further, US
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recently suggested
that Egyptians look to the South African Constitution, rather
than the US Constitution, as inspiration for the Egyptian
constitutional drafting process.30
decisions/1999/99_van%20vuuren.html (“The applicant stated in his application that
he was instructed by Captain Loots to eliminate Adv. Dikgang Moseneke. He was also
handed a file relating to Mr Moseneke at the same time. He kept Mr Moseneke under
surveillance for a time. He thereafter received instructions to abandon the operation.
He is seeking amnesty for the conspiracy to murder Mr. Moseneke. He also alleges that
the offence was associated with a political objective as Mr Moseneke, a prominent
member of the PAC, was promoting the struggle of the liberation movements.”).
27. See Ziyad Motala, Constitution-Making in Divided Societies and Legitimacy: Lessons
from the South African Experience, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 147, 151 (2005)
(noting that the Interim Constitution was passed by the White parliament); Judges:
Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke, CONST. COURT S. AFR., http://
www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/justicedikgangmoseneke/index1.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2014) (stating that Justice Moseneke served on the technical committee
that drafted the Constitution).
28 . The History of the Constitution, CONST. COURT S. AFR., http://
www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/theconstitution/history.htm#1993 (last visited Feb.
12, 2014) (noting that the Constitutional Assembly had to work within particular
parameters including: (a) a requirement of a two-thirds majority for the adoption of
the new Constitution; (b) compliance with thirty-four constitutional principles agreed
to in the interim Constitution; and (c) a deadline of two years).
29. Rowan Philip, In Love with SA’s Constitution: Why Does a US Supreme Court Justice
Prefer South Africa’s Constitution to Her Own?, MAIL & GUARDIAN: AFRICA’S BEST READ
(Feb. 24, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://mg.co.za/article/2012-02-24-in-love-with-sasconstitution.
30. See id.; Ariane de Vogue, Ginsburg Likes S. Africa as Model for Egypt, ABC NEWS
(Feb. 3, 2012, 11:33 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/02/ginsburg-
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The South African Constitution, adopted in 1996, is unique
in that, while incorporating many of the democratic ideals and
structures present in the US Constitution, it also incorporates
numerous human rights concepts taken from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, among others.31 Indeed,
many nations have recognized human rights values in their
constitutions, but South Africa is widely considered a leader in
the progressive constitutional promotion of human rights
through its full enumeration of civil, political, social, economic,
and cultural rights.32
The South African Constitution currently consists of a
Preamble, fourteen Chapters, and seventeen Amendments. 33
The most recent Amendment—the Seventeenth, adopted in
February 2013—addresses an important issue that directly
concerns Justice Moseneke. The Seventeenth Amendment
realigned the Courts, positioning the Constitutional Court as
the highest court, with review of all others, even the Supreme
Court of Appeals. 34 The Amendment expanded the
Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction, and it may now hear all
likes-s-africa-as-model-for-egypt (“‘I would not look to the U.S. Constitution, if I were
drafting a Constitution in the year 2012. I might look at the Constitution of South
Africa . . . . That was a deliberate attempt to have a fundamental instrument of
government that embraced basic human rights, had an independent judiciary . . . . It
really is, I think, a great piece of work that was done. Much more recent than the U.S.
Constitution.’” (quoting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg)).
31. S. AFR. CONST., 1996; Jeremy Sarkin, The Effect of Constitutional Borrowings on
the Drafting of South Africa’s Bill of Rights and Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions, 1
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 176, 183 (1998) (“[A]ccording to two of the technical drafters of the
interim Bill of Rights, Lourens du Plessis and Hugh Corder, international instruments
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (1966); and the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) served as sources of inspiration.”).
The Bill of Rights of the Interim Constitution of 1993 was codified in full in Chapter 2
of the Constitution of 1996, with the addition of some socio-economic rights. Compare
S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, with S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, ch. 3.
32. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 7–39.
33. See generally id.
34. See S. AFR. CONST., Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012.
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matters, even those with no bearing on the Constitution.35 With
this Amendment, our guest, now the Acting Chief Justice of the
Constitutional Court, is the highest-ranking Judge in South
Africa. We are honored to have had the opportunity to speak
with such an influential figure, and, furthermore, to have
interviewed him at a time when South Africa’s peaceful
transition to democracy may shed light on methods to
accomplish similar transitions in North Africa and the Middle
East.
The interview that follows has been divided into four Parts:
(I) social, economic, and cultural rights in the South African
Constitution; (II) promoting rights of people with HIV/AIDS;
(III) housing rights; and (IV) transitioning to democracy.
Before each interview section, the Board has provided some
legal and historical context for Justice Moseneke’s remarks.
These additions should not be considered the words of Justice
Moseneke, and must be attributed, if cited, to Conor Colasurdo
and Rebecca Marlin, on behalf of the Fordham International Law
Journal. Questions asked by the Board have been marked “FILJ.”
I. SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE
SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
The bedrock of the international human rights framework
consists of three documents: the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948) (“UDHR”), the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (“ICCPR”), and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(1966) (“ICESCR”). Together, these documents are known as
the “International Bill of Rights” of the human rights
framework.36 Though often taken as a group in the study of
35. See id. The Constitutional Court may now hear all constitutional matters, as
well as “any other matter, if the Constitutional Court grants leave to appeal on the
grounds that the matter raises an arguable point of law of general public importance
which ought to be considered by that Court.” Id.
36. See John P. Humphrey, The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation,
17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 527–28 (1976) (discussing the conceptualization of an
International Bill of Rights, and its eventual construction as the three above-mentioned
documents taken together).
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international human rights, in application, there has been a
large divide among States in promoting these documents. The
rights enshrined in the ICCPR are frequently recognized and
implemented by national governments, while many States have
been reluctant to engage in the realization of the rights laid out
in the ICESCR.37 The United States, for example, has notably
refused to ratify the ICESCR, after debating it for several years.38
The rights outlined in these two treaties have been
categorized within the so-called “three generations of rights”
framework: first generation rights are civil and political; second
generation rights are socio-economic; and third generation
rights refers to more far-reaching rights, such as environmental
and developmental rights. 39 First generation rights are
considered “negative” rights, meaning the State must refrain
from interference, such as depriving an individual or group of

37. HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,
POLITICS, MORALS 263–64 (3d ed. 2008) (noting that most states are conflicted as to
whether to include economic and social rights in their governance, with the result that
many vocally support economic and social rights, but “fail[] to take steps to entrench
those rights constitutionally, to adopt legislative or administrative provisions based
explicitly on the recognition of specific ESR as international human rights, or to
provide effective means of redress to individuals or groups alleging violations of those
rights”); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 839 (2012) (demonstrating through empirical study
the greater rate of inclusion of civil and political rights in national constitutions, as
compared to inclusion of economic, social, and cultural rights); OFFICE OF THE U.N.
HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS:
HANDBOOK FOR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 3–4 (lamenting that
“[e]conomic, social, and cultural rights are . . . widely recognized in domestic legal
systems, although not to the same extent as civil and political rights,” and
recommending equal recognition within national governments).
38. Id. at 281–82. (describing the ambivalence of the United States towards the
ICESCR, with varying opinions on the Covenant in each new presidential
administration); http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/juvICCPR.cfm (noting
that although the United States has recognized civil and political rights through
ratification of the ICCPR, it has done so with the inclusion of five “Reservations,” five
“Understandings,” and three “Declarations,” which limit its application in the United
States).
39. See Daniel Schneider, The Constitutional Right to Housing in South Africa: The
Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Irene Grootboom, 2 INT’L J. CIV. SOC’Y
45, 47 (2004) (outlining the three generations of rights and their positive and negative
obligations).
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the right to vote or engage in civic life.40 Second generation
rights are “positive,” requiring action on the part of the State to
provide citizens with access to food, housing, healthcare,
workers’ rights, education, and more. 41 This stark contrast
between State obligations under either a first or second
generation rights regime may explain why some States have
chosen not to adopt the ICESCR, even though the ICESCR is
clear that socio-economic rights should be implemented
progressively with regard to the capabilities of each individual
state.42
Arguments on both sides of the debate are impassioned,
and present different perspectives that may go to the core of a
State’s self-conception. One scholar poses the question as:
What good was the right to free speech and to vote . . . if
one was starving, homeless and illiterate? The opposing view
was that civil and political rights were the only legitimate
form of rights, and that socio-economic rights undermined
individual freedom, interfered with free markets by
justifying massive state intervention in the economy, and
provided an excuse to ignore or even violate civil and
political rights.43

The United States has been the most public opponent of
the ICESCR, though the covenant was signed by former US
President Carter and submitted to Congress for ratification.44
Former Presidents Reagan and Bush opposed ratification,
noting that “the idea of economic and social rights is easily
abused by repressive governments which claim that they
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Article 2(1) of the ICESCR:
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the
adoption of legislative measures.”
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), G.A.
Res. 14531, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966).
43. Schneider, supra note 39, at 47.
44. STEINER ET AL., supra note 37, at 281.
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promote human rights even though they deny their citizens the
basic . . . civil and political rights.”45 The United States relaxed
its position against socio-economic rights throughout the
Clinton and second Bush administrations, and though President
Obama has promoted extensive legislation on healthcare, his
administration has stated that, “it does not seek action [on the
ICESCR] at this time.”46
Alternatively, South Africa has been a major proponent of
social, economic, and cultural rights. The South African
Constitution purposely adopted the language and rights of both
major covenants47: civil and political rights are enshrined in the
right to vote,48 the right to privacy,49 the right to security of the
person,50 the right to life,51 and the right to equality before the
law,52 among others. Economic, social, and cultural rights exist
in the right to housing, 53 the right to food, water, and
healthcare, and social assistance,54 and labor rights such as the
right to unionize.55 The socio-economic rights listed in South
Africa’s Bill of Rights make a bold and important statement
about South Africa’s commitment to protecting these rights.
The South African government has implemented these rights to
varying degrees of success, and in the following portion of the
45. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE FOR
1992, SUBMITTED TO THE S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL. & H.R. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFF. 5
(J. Comm. Print 1993).
46. Barbara Stark, At Last? Ratification of the Economic Covenant as a CongressionalExecutive Agreement, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 108 (2011).
47. Lourens W.H. Ackermann, The Legal Nature of the South African Constitutional
Revoluation, in 1 THE DIGNITY JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA 43 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 2013) (“[T]he rights and inherent values
of dignity, equality, and freedom lie at the heart of the South African Constitution and
enjoy the highest entrenchment in the Constitution, requiring for their amendment a
supporting vote of at least 75 percent of the members of the National Assembly, and of
at least six out of nine provinces in the National Council of Provinces.”).
48. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 19.
49. Id. § 14.
50. Id. § 12.
51. Id. § 11.
52. Id. § 9.
53. Id. § 26.
54. Id. § 27.
55. Id. § 23.
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interview, Justice Moseneke describes how the Constitutional
Court has served to protect socio-economic rights.
FILJ: During the lecture today you spoke a lot about the
socio-economic rights that are within your Constitution. Do you
think that this transition phase inspired them to be included in
the Constitution?
Justice Moseneke: Yes, yes indeed. Now remember that all
this caused in its original law about rights, and that
categorization—so-called first generation rights, and second
generation rights, and third generation rights—a lot of debate
about the intersection between first and second generation
rights. And that explains why subsequently, of course, you had
the Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights Convention that came
subsequent to the initial [civil and political] human rights.
Because the debate had always been there; we are not the
originators of the debate. The question was: “How do you
protect so-called second generation rights?” And many
governments, including [the United States’] and others,
dismissed it as something that isn’t properly justiciable, that’s
not enforceable by law, and that may be a matter of political
contestation. And we each get a different view on it, and
therefore we [South Africans] were part of that worldview that
said that these were rights just as important as your right to
freedom. You know? Freedom without water, it’s madness. We
insisted that the connection is blatant. If you look at the
Covenants—like, you know, Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights—the point is made that rights are indivisible. You can’t
pick and choose what you like because they tend to be
reinforcing. They quite indicate it’s a thin line between the two.
Because really equality is about equal worth in society, and
worth is about dignity.
So, we decided we’re not going to nitpick. We’re going to
have a package that would protect those who were at the cutting
end of an unequal society. And that’s what apartheid was. That’s
what colonialism was. That’s what apartheid ultimately was. So
there’s a deep desire to try and take active steps to equalize
society. You could do a number of things. You could say, “We
are all free men and women. The right to equality is
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inalienable,” and a few other clever things. But in the end you
actually have to confront inequality . . . . Without being overly
ideological about it, that is the issue that we were concerned
about. And South Africans had varying levels of concern about
it. Those that were reasonably well-heeled didn’t care much
about it, equality. And those who were the neediest cared much
about it. And it’s quite natural.
FILJ: Would you say that South Africa has been a model for
the region in terms of promoting economic and social rights?
Justice Moseneke: Yeah. I don’t want to sound arrogant, but
you know we, we have shed some light, I think, on those issues.
A lot of work has been done in the region and particularly with
other stakeholders in other governments. But certainly the
destruction of poverty and the reduction of social distance is a
very big preoccupation of South Africans. There are many
societies where, you know, the approach is, “Tough luck. You do
what you can.” You know, “Get yourself straight and right,” you
know? We say that, too, to our children, but we also say it’s
important to have arrangements which would look after those
who are vulnerable.
Social justice is a very important part of our understanding
of democracy. I know it’s not what you have in [the United
States]. That’s why you’re having this crazy debate around
Obamacare. Which, as you heard in my lecture, we don’t have
and can’t have. Government must build public hospitals. Must
build clinics. It must provide pre-natal treatment for women. It
must do it. So that means we must take part of our money . . .
we must appropriate money to take care of that. So that is not an
election or campaign thing. You can’t go and say, “If you vote
me in, I will build you hospitals.” You have to do it. You can say,
“I’ll make them run more efficiently,” of course. And that’s what
most politicians are saying, you know. But you can’t say, “I’ll
provide you with a public schooling system.” No, you must do it.
And it’s a difference, I think, in our approaches and philosophy.
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II. PROMOTING RIGHTS OF PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS
South Africa’s history with HIV/AIDS has been long and
troubled; South Africa currently has a higher prevalence of
HIV/AIDS than any other nation in the world—approximately
6.1 million people, or about eighteen percent, were living with
HIV/AIDS in 2012—and nearly 240,000 people died of AIDSrelated causes in the same year.56 The amount of affected young
women is even more dramatic, with 3.4 million HIV positive
women in South Africa in 2012.57 Today, there are 2.5 million
children in South Africa who have been orphaned by
HIV/AIDS,58 and of the children who are maternal orphans,
over seventy percent have lost their mothers to AIDS-related
illnesses.59
Why has the AIDS epidemic affected South Africa so
significantly? One large factor is South Africa’s delayed response
in addressing the epidemic and introducing antiretroviral
treatments (“ARVs”) as part of a national strategy to combat
HIV/AIDS.60 Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa from 1998
to 2008, and his Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang,
infamously questioned both the realities of HIV transmission as
well as the effectiveness of ARVs.61 President Mbeki failed to
implement a successful national AIDS prevention strategy;
under his leadership, AIDS reduction was not a government
priority. When he was recalled from the presidency in 2008,

56 . HIV and AIDS Estimates (2012), UNAIDS, http://www.unaids.org/en/
regionscountries/countries/southafrica (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
57. Global Health Facts: Women Living with HIV/AIDS (Aged 15 and Over), HENRY J.
KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/global-indicator/women-living-with-hivaids (last
visited Feb. 12, 2014).
58. HIV and AIDS Estimates (2012), supra note 56.
59. HIV and AIDS in South Africa, AVERT.ORG, http://www.avert.org/hiv-aids-southafrica.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
60 . HIV/AIDS in South Africa, AIDS FOUND. S. AFR., http://www.aids.org.za/
hivaids-in-south-africa (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (citing a “history of poor leadership in
response to the epidemic” as a factor in South Africa’s extremely high prevalence rate).
61. HIV and AIDS in South Africa, supra note 59 (noting Mr. Tshabalala-Msimang’s
supposed cure for HIV of beetroot and garlic consumption).
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more than 18.5% of the adult population was living with
HIV/AIDS.62
While there is clearly much work to be done, there are
reasons to be hopeful. In 2013, Health Minister Aaron
Motsoaledi announced that South Africa had “turned the
corner” in the fight against the AIDS epidemic, while still
acknowledging the long road ahead. 63 The government has
attempted to combat HIV/AIDS through the promotion of
ARVs, and today more than two million South Africans are
benefitting from these drugs. 64 Mother-to-child transmission
reduction remains a top priority; 65 in 2011, over ninety-five
percent of pregnant women received treatment to prevent
transmission to their children. 66 The government has also
worked to address the secondary effects of HIV/AIDS: the
National Strategic Plan of 2012–2016 includes the provision of
basic services to children orphaned by AIDS.67 Finally, a huge
media campaign was launched by the government in 2010 with
62. Thabo Mbeki—Biography, JOURNAIDS.ORG, http://www.journaids.org/index.
php/essential_information/hivaids_key_people/thabo_mbeki (last visited Feb. 12,
2014) (referencing President Mbeki’s 2008 recall, “triggering the start of a new era of
AIDS governance”); Epidemiological Factsheet on HIV and AIDS: South Africa, UNAIDS
(2009), http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/southafrica (follow
“Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV and AIDS, 2009”).
63. Ron Allen, South Africa ‘Turns Corner’ on HIV/AIDS, But Still Has a Long Way to
Go, NBC NEWS (Aug. 12, 2013, 3:39 PM), available at http://thegrio.com/2013/08/12/
south-africa-turns-corner-on-hivaids-but-still-has-a-long-way-to-go (quoting Motsoaledi:
“We know it is a long way, still quite a journey, but we’ve definitely turned the corner”).
64. Id.
65. See S. AFR. DEP’T OF HEALTH, NATIONAL PMTCT ACCELERATED PLAN (A-PLAN)
STATUS REPORT (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.sarrahsouthafrica.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Qt5CxiOrHFc%3D&tabid=2326 (outlining a four-pronged
approach to mother-to-child prevention: 1) including HIV prevention measures in preexisting services such as reproductive health care; 2) counseling women with HIV to
make informed decisions about their reproductive life; 3) preventing unintended
pregnancies; and 4) addressing HIV treatment and management for already-pregnant
HIV positive women).
66. UNAIDS, WORLD AIDS DAY REPORT 30 (2012), available at http://www.unaids.
org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/epidemiology/2012/gr2012/JC2434
_WorldAIDSday_results_en.pdf.
67. The Plan intends to provide a “comprehensive package that will remove
structural barriers” for orphans and vulnerable children. S. AFR. HIV CLINICIANS SOC’Y,
NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN ON HIV, STIS AND TB 2012–2016, at 78 (2012), available at
http://www.sahivsoc.org/upload/documents/National_Strategic_Plan_2012.pdf.
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the purpose of raising awareness, with some signs of success
three years later.68
A strategy to reduce the transmission and debilitating
effects of HIV/AIDS would not be complete without the
incorporation of human rights. South Africa’s Bill of Rights
contains numerous provisions adopted from the ICCPR and the
ICESCR that address the rights of those living with HIV/AIDS.
To specify several of the most significant, there is the right to
human dignity, which ensures that no person or organization,
such as a hospital or company, may degrade another person
because of their HIV/AIDS status;69 the right to freedom and
security of the person, which prevents violations of a person’s
bodily integrity, such as forced HIV testing;70 and the right to
privacy, which gives each person the individual choice of
whether to disclose their status.71 Additional highly significant
rights include the right to health care and social assistance;72 the
rights to housing 73 and education 74 for all, even those with
HIV/AIDS; and freedom of trade, occupation, and profession
without discrimination based on HIV status. 75 Finally, the
freedom of association 76 and the right to have access to
information77 have been frequently exercised in allowing people

68. Jodi McNeil, A History of Official Government HIV/AIDS Policy in South Africa, S.
AFR. HIST. ONLINE, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/history-official-governmenthivaids-policy-south-africa (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (“In April [2010], an HIV
Counselling and Testing (HCT) media campaign was launched by the government to
increase discussion of HIV in South Africa. It operated through door-to-door
campaigning and billboards to promote the availability of free testing and counseling
in health clinics, as well as to reduce the myths and stigma surrounding the disease. . . .
There has been steady progress since, and by 31 May 2011 Health Minister Motsoaledi
proudly announced that 11.9 million South Africans were being tested for HIV every
year.”).
69. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 10.
70. Id. § 12.
71. Id. § 14.
72. Id. § 27.
73. Id. § 26.
74. Id. § 29.
75. Id. § 22.
76. Id. § 18.
77. Id. § 32.
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living with HIV/AIDS to organize and distribute life-saving
information to others.
Justice Moseneke took some time to speak with us about
one particular constitutional case that addressed the rights of
those living with HIV/AIDS and put to the test how far the
Constitutional Court would go in protecting the socio-economic
rights listed in the Bill of Rights. The case concerned,
specifically, the right to health care, both for adults and for
children in the context of mother-to-child transmission. A group
called the Treatment Action Campaign (the “TAC”) initiated
the case. Launched in 1998, the TAC focuses on HIV/AIDS
awareness and prevention, with the specific goal of ensuring that
all South Africans, not just the wealthy, have access to ARVs.78
The TAC has been extremely successful; in a 2003 article in the
New Yorker, current US Ambassador to the United Nations
Samantha Power lauded the TAC as “the most important
dissident in the country since Nelson Mandela.”79
In 2002, the TAC came to international fame by suing the
South African government in the Constitutional Court, in a case
known as Treatment Action Campaign v. Minister of Health.80 The
case surrounded the drug Nevirapine, which, if taken at birth by
mother and child, prevents mother-to-child transmission of
HIV. 81 The government had been given a large supply of
Nevirapine for free by its manufacturers, and had begun a
program to distribute the drug at only two sites in the country.82
The TAC argued that this was a violation of Articles 27 and 28 of
the South African Bill of Rights, which state, respectively, that
“Everyone has the right to have access to health care services,
including reproductive health care,” and that “Every child has
the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services

78. About Treatment Action Campaign, TAC.ORG, http://www.tac.org.za/about_us
(last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
79. Samantha Power, Letter from South Africa: The AIDS Rebel, NEW YORKER, May 19,
2003, at 54.
80. 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.).
81. Id. para. 5 n.3.
82. Id. para. 19
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and social services.”83 The Constitutional Court, to which Justice
Moseneke had recently been appointed, found that in declining
to extend the program beyond the two designated sites, the
government had failed to protect the rights of mothers and
children to basic health care.84 The government was ordered to
distribute the drug to all women and infants as medically
prescribed. 85 The decision was momentous and reaffirmed
South Africa’s commitment to the protection of socio-economic
rights for women, children, and those living with HIV/AIDS.
FILJ: Can you tell us about some of the earliest cases where
you were implementing these new rights and maybe where they
weren’t as easily accepted as they are today?
Justice Moseneke: Yes. I didn’t talk today about a very
important case called TAC v. The Minister of Health. TAC is
Treatment Action Campaign. After the transition, we stumbled
into an AIDS epidemic. It must have been building up just
before the transition, and then we found—and this was another
brand of HIV, which came out of heterosexual sexual contact,
not out of homosexual sexual contact, which was what was
known and seen in California and other parts of the world, and
this country and the world. So ours was a different brand on the
African continent. It was mainly heterosexual. TAC was formed
to try and bring solidarity around people who live or are affected
by HIV and AIDS. And mothers, pregnant mothers, were
affected by this, and the scourge would be transferred from
mother to child. And there were antiretrovirals that had just
been discovered, which could retard or exclude transmission or
infection from mother to child, for instance, a child in utero. So
this was something wonderful, very special in the sense that it’s
good. Otherwise you have babies born with HIV and AIDS, and
you increase the incidence in the country substantially. And
many children who would live with HIV/AIDS from childhood.
83. Id. para. 4; S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 27(1), 28(1).
84. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA para. 135(2).
85. Id. para 135 (3).
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The government dragged its feet about this. A bit . . .
there’s a bit of sophistry. The arguments were, “Do you spend
money on the living or on the dead?” Limited resources. You
know, do you spend them on those who, in any event, are going
to pass on, or do you spend it on those who are young, healthy,
vibrant and want to go on? The government refused to spend
billions of rand buying pharmaceutical products—and mainly
from the U.S. and other Western countries—so it would take a
big part of our budget to buy this stuff and the government said,
“No, we’re not doing any of it.” TAC came to court, and we
ordered them to do it.
Today, we have I think the most progressive treatment
regime—public treatment regime—in the world. And all the
numbers of HIV/AIDS are all looking southwards. All of them.
And the new infections, mother-to-child transmission, mortality
among those already infected. We look at those numbers very
closely in our country, and we have an expansive scheme where
we provide HIV/AIDS treatment. It’s a very progressive scheme,
which has been joined by people like Bill Gates and others who
have provided, at least now, funding. So it looks particularly
good. So, it’s an example of a socio-economic rights case which
has made a real difference. Housing has been another area.
Access to water has been another. Access to education with all of
the government to supply textbooks and stuff where they have
not done so. So in regards to the Constitution, we have tried to
breath life into those cold words on paper.
III. HOUSING RIGHTS
Like much of the developing world, South Africa struggles
with the issue of adequate housing. From the time of
colonization to the present, many Black, Coloured, and
Indian/Asian South Africans have lived in what are commonly
referred to as “townships,” or areas designated for non-White
dwellers under apartheid legislation.86 As of 2005, approximately
86. See S. AFR. DEP’T CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE & TRADITIONAL AFF., TOWNSHIP
TRANSFORMATION TIMELINE 6 (June 2009), available at http://www.shisaka.co.za/
documents/TownshipTransformationTLnarrative.pdf. It should be noted that under
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thirty-six percent of the South African population lives in the
townships, and most of those living there are Black.87 Within
townships, there are both formal housing structures and
informal housing structures, which commonly take the form of
shacks. Life in these informal homes can be grim to Western
observers, as many of these shacks lack running water,
electricity, and basic sanitation services.88 In 2000, the “appalling
conditions” of some of South Africa’s housing culminated in a
case before the South African Constitutional Court: The
Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Irene Grootboom and
Others.89
Irene Grootboom lived in Wallacedene, an informal
settlement outside of Cape Town. All of the residents of
Wallacedene lived in shacks, none of which had access to water,
sewage, or garbage disposal services. Only five percent of the
shacks had access to electricity. Grootboom lived with her sister
and their families in a shack that was only twenty square meters
(roughly 215 square feet).90 To make matters worse, much of
Wallacedene was waterlogged.91

current South African law, “township” has a different non-racially-charged meaning. See
Land Survey Act 8 of 1997 § 1(xxv) (S. Afr.) (defining “township” as “a group of pieces
of land, or of subdivisions of a piece of land, which are combined with public places
and are used mainly for residential, industrial, business or similar purposes, or are
intended to be so used”).
87. S. AFR. DEP’T CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE & TRADITIONAL AFF., supra note 86,
at 8. Although not all homes in townships are informal settlements, around nine to ten
percent of the South African population lives in informal settlements (shacks) outside
of a backyard. See S. AFR. HOUS. DEV. AGENCY, SOUTH AFRICA: INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS
STATUS 24 (2012), available at http://www.thehda.co.za/uploads/images/HDA_
Informal_settlements_status_South_Africa.pdf.
88. See Schneider, supra note 39, at 45.
89. 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.).
90. As a contrast, the average New York City studio apartment, a typical home for
one city dweller in New York, is 550 square feet. Pauline Kim, NYC Mayor: Diminutive
Dwelling Design Wanted, CNN (July 10, 2012, 6:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/
10/us/new-york-microunits/index.html. Grootboom lived with her common law
husband, their child, her sister and her sister’s husband, and their three children. See
Schneider, supra note 39, at 51. Grootbloom, therefore, was living with seven other
people in less than half the space of one New Yorker living on his/her own.
91. See Grootbloom, 2000 (11) BCLR para. 7.
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One of the first initiatives adopted by the newly elected
ANC government was the Reconstruction and Development
Programme (“RDP”), which initially aimed, among other things,
at building one million low-cost affordable housing units within
five years.92 In 1997, the South African parliament enacted the
Housing Act, which sought “to provide citizens and permanent
residents with access to permanent residential structures with
secure tenure ensuring internal and external privacy and to
provide adequate protection against the elements.”93 Noble as
this may be, however, the Act had, according to the Court:
no express provision to facilitate access to temporary relief for
people who have no access to land, no roof over their heads,
for people who are living in intolerable conditions and for
people who are in crisis because of natural disasters such as
floods and fires, or because their homes are under threat of
demolition.94

Indeed, as the Court then noted, “[t]hese are people in
desperate need.”95
Like many of the people living in townships, Grootboom
and her co-respondents had applied for low-cost permanent
government subsidized housing, but faced a waiting list several
years long. 96 Thus, Grootboom and others packed up their
shacks and re-located to nearby privately owned land that was
supposed to eventually become low cost housing.97 The owner of
the land then sought to evict Grootboom and the others, even
though the group had no other place to go as their spaces back
in Wallacedene had been filled by new residents.
As noted above, South Africa’s Constitution is, in a sense,
an international oddity in that it enshrines socio-economic
rights within its Bill of Rights. Specifically, two sections of the
92. Policy Documents: A Basic Guide to the Reconstruction and Development Programme,
AFR. NAT’L CONG., http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=234 (last visited Feb. 12,
2014).
93. Grootbloom, 2000 (11) BCLR para. 51 (emphasis added).
94. Id. para. 52 (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. Id. para. 8 (“Many had applied for subsidised low-cost housing from the
municipality and had been on the waiting list for as long as seven years.”).
97. Id.
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South African Constitution appear to directly address the rights
of South Africans to adequate housing. First, the Bill of Rights,
section 26, declares that:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate
housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realisation of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their
home demolished, without an order of court made after
considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation
may permit arbitrary evictions.98

Second, the Bill of Rights, section 28, provides that “Every
child has the right . . . (c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic
health care services and social services.”99
Though the South African Constitution requires the
government to act to ameliorate the types of conditions
affecting the Wallacedene community,100 this duty is qualified by
the fact that the State is not required to “go beyond available
resources or to realise these rights immediately.”101 Therefore,
the housing rights found in these two sections of the
Constitution do not entitle South Africans to housing on
demand, but to a government that implements “a coherent, coordinated programme designed to meet” its socio-economic
constitutional obligations.102 The Constitutional Court did not
lay out exactly what this means in the Grootboom opinion, but it
did note that the situation in Wallacedene indicated that the
State was failing to “devise, fund, implement and supervise
measures to provide relief to those in desperate need.”103
98. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 26
99. Id. § 28 (emphasis added).
100. Grootbloom, 2000 (11) BCLR para. 93.
101. Id. para. 94.
102. Id. para. 95.
103. Id. para. 96. The above is only a very brief summary of The Republic of South
Africa v. Grootboom and Others. The full opinion is available for free at:
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/19.pdf. For more on the housing situation
in South Africa, see, for example, David Smith, White South Africans’ Move to Black
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FILJ: Earlier today, you were speaking about the right to
housing, specifically in the context of the RDP housing and the
townships. Can you talk to us about the process that citizens go
through applying for RDP housing—and how that right is
enforced by the courts?
Justice Moseneke: Sure. A lot of things happen, of course,
besides and outside the courts. There will be a housing budget,
some of the money is given to the municipality; the other money
goes to the province, and then the national. But generally the
money gets distributed to these two levels [municipality and
province] to build homes, because national will find it difficult
to build homes themselves. Homes are built, a waiting list is
developed, and it’s very long. And homes are allocated. It’s one
of the few places you’ll see in the world where we build homes
and give them away. If you show need and you’re on the waiting
list and you live in the area [in addition to a few other
requirements], many people have been given homes. But you
must demonstrate that you can’t, you know, “I’ve got my home, I
have to maintain my home, I pay bond,” you know. Like
anybody else, or you know . . . . Most Africans have collateral,
so the banking system works. So we’re talking about vulnerable
people. Let’s just get this clear. We don’t have a jurisdiction
where everybody says “Hello, I need a home,” and they get a
home. A jurisdiction where if you demonstrate the need, then
you can lay a claim to be provided with access to housing.
Sometimes access takes the form of the government
helping provide infrastructure available to own a home.
Sometimes it takes the form of a government building “bachelor
flats”—I don’t know what they call them here, I don’t know why
they call them bachelors, because it could be a man or a woman
but we call things “bachelor”—single apartments, or something
like that. The government builds low-cost apartments, then
Township Draws Praise and Accusations, GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2013, 5:28 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/03/white-south-africans-move-blacktownship.
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people rent them. So if you’re employed and it’s within your
range, then you rent a subsidized apartment. So access takes
many forms, and has been happening for long, you know? The
conspicuous lack of access relates to shack dwellers. They are
conspicuous, you see them. When you fly to Cape Town, you go
to Jo’burg, you go to Kliptown, you see people living . . . and as
I say, many, many units have been built, many, many more have
to be built. But, in twenty years, I think on balance the
government has done well; they could have done better. In this
bleak age, there is corruption related: the procurement process,
the tenant process has not been as good as it could be, and
many people feel that the government could have done better
than it has done. I’d say that’s probably true.
If you came and told us that you need a home, and you’re
entitled to one, and you meet the requirements, we’ll ask the
government, “Why doesn’t she have a home?” There’s a
question to be answered there. They’ll have to file a brief where
they set out the facts, and they do that routinely. It happens in
other contexts: when people are evicted as unlawful occupiers,
they always cause the government to be joined as a party in those
proceedings. Under our jurisprudence, the government must
always be ordered to provide alternative accommodation. If an
owner who has squatters on the land wants to get them away, we
say to the owner, “You take it easy, you can’t rush around, this is
a social issue.” We join the government and when we say an
order ought to be made to evict the “unlawful” dwellers, the
shack dwellers, whatever you want to call them, occupiers, the
government must tell us how they plan to provide alternative
accommodation. And it’s worked like a bomb. So we indirectly
compel the government to buy land to house landless people.
And landlessness has come out of our community experience of
dispossession. That’s where it comes from. So you have millions
of South Africans who have no place they can call home, they
have no land that they can point to and say, “That’s my land, I’m
going to build there.” So we, the Court hears, something we
talked about today: we have succeeded a whole jurisprudence on
unlawful occupiers. I’ve personally written several opinions on
that, and the Court has generated opinions where we’re slow at
evicting people. Even you or I have to stay there patiently as we
work out. Because if you throw someone out of farm A, what do
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you think they’re going to do? They have to live somewhere,
they’re going to live on farm B. The owner of farm B throws
them out and then they go to farm C. And destroying their
livelihoods. Think about it, their children, their schooling,
everything that goes with it. So every time we have a claim, the
government must find alternative accommodation, and they
must give us a plan, where they’re going to take them.
In urban dwellings, when inner city collapse happens, and
people have to be moved, either because the building is unsafe,
even in cases like that. It’s fine, but where are you going to take
them to? So government has begun to build in Jo’burg, for
instance, urban stock, where they clean up urban buildings so
they can put people in there. So there have been some success
stories around socio-economic jurisprudence. The government
hates it, but if there’s a case, we order them to be joined because
we know what’s going to happen. It’s a clash between private
ownership and public need—that’s where the conflict is. And we
resolve it by placing it at the door of the government. In [the
United States] I know what you’d do; you’d say, “We don’t want
big taxes, we don’t want big government,” but we do the other
way around and it has worked, by and large. Are there many
people who have don’t homes? Yes. Are they all South African?
No, let me tell you that. The burden of Zimbabwe, we carry. The
burden of Somalia, we carry. Because most of the people you
talk to in formal settlements they don’t speak in South African
languages, they come from somewhere else.
IV. TRANSITIONING TO DEMOCRACY
Transitional justice is one of the most-discussed topics of
international legal discourse, and South Africa is rightfully at the
center of it.104 As apartheid slowly fell throughout the 1980s and
104. See, e.g., Dustin N. Sharp, Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition:
Toward A Positive-Peace Paradigm for Transitional Justice, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 780, 792
(2012); Thomas Obel Hansen, Transitional Justice: Toward A Differentiated Theory, 13 OR.
REV. INT'L L. 1 (2011); Jamie Rowen, Social Reality and Philosophical Ideals in Transitional
Justice, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 93, 94 (2008); Eric Brahm, Transitional
Justice, Civil Society, and the Development of the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies, 9 INT'L J.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 62 (2007); Erika de Wet, The "Friendly but Cautious" Reception of
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early 1990s, Latin American nations likewise shifted from
military to civilian control, and Eastern Europeans crafted new
democracies after the fall of the Berlin Wall.105 Currently, much
of North Africa and the Middle East are facing, often arduously,
transitions from authoritarian rule. In 2010, the world’s
nineteen predominately Arab-speaking nations shared one
characteristic: “constitutional veneers [that were] flimsy
disguises for strongman rule.” 106 In astonishingly quick
succession in the spring of 2011, governments in Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya, and Yemen fell to popular protest. 107 Other countries
throughout the region have exploded into demonstrations and
violence, typified by the civil war raging in Syria against the
Bashar al-Assad regime.108
In the aftermath of the rapid shifts in power throughout
Middle Eastern states, international discourse of the so-called
“Arab Spring” turned to worries of an “Islamist Winter.”109 Some
have claimed that events such as the Ennahda Party’s win of the
plurality vote in the Tunisian elections for their new
Constitutional Assembly, and the inauguration of Mohammed
Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood as the President of Egypt,
“promise[] nothing but sorrow and future conflict” for the
region.110
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As a direct participant in South Africa’s constitutional
transition, Justice Moseneke is in a unique position to speak to
the choices made by South Africans, and advise other societiesin-transition throughout the world.
FILJ: One of the key questions we’re interested in is the
transition from apartheid to democracy, and the Constitution as
a reaction to apartheid. Do you have any general thoughts that
you’d like to say about that?
Justice Moseneke: We had a few choices. One of the
choices was to find a way through. We would have had a
bloodbath. Our choice was to think through a mechanism that
would leave both sides sort of simply confident to go through
the process. And we cut up the process into comfortable,
confidence-building exercises. And the first was: government
and people, let’s talk. Here are the bottom lines. And these were
agreed to very quickly. The bottom lines were quite obvious. For
instance, you know, adult franchise. Remember that Black
people were not allowed to vote at all. So the demand was
“Everybody’s going to vote.” It looks obviously simple, but what
it really means is that the white man was going to lose political
power. Because, you know, the numbers are self-evident. So, if
we vote at all on adult suffrage, or franchise, it meant that there
was going to be an instant change of government. It meant that
Nelson Mandela was going to become President immediately
after the elections. And this is what happened. So you’re really
not just asking them to allow everybody to vote; you’re asking
them to surrender power. Which they agreed to do.
FILJ: If you could give one piece of advice to societies in
transition, given South Africa as an example, what would you say
to them?
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Justice Moseneke: We’ve used principles of democracy and
the rule of law to structure our transition. We didn’t leave it
open-ended to political forces. Those are ever present but we
did it with discipline. You need some form of discipline. If you
look at Egypt, and you look at Libya, you look at . . . you have
to decide, if you decide it’s going to be a Muslim state, so be it;
and then you have to find some path to take it from there to a
Muslim state, and it must be, the principles must be . . . . In
that case it was clear, that step one was going to be negotiation,
was going to be peaceful. One thing is the law to dismantle
apartheid, and the other the law to replace apartheid. There was
a straightjacket that we created, and worked within it. And at
every step, we were going to negotiate this agreement. One, we’ll
have an Interim Constitution, and, two, Parliament must adopt
it. Three, Parliament must dissolve itself once the Constitution is
adopted. Four, holding of elections by a credible body, the IEC
[Independent Electoral Commission], that Professor McDougall
and I served, we were eventually the government during that
interim. We could commandeer this, commandeer that, because
there basically was no real government; there was an outgoing
government which had voted in this new Constitution, this
Interim Constitution, which basically had a sell-by date. The
27th, the starting of elections, the government ceased to exist.
So you need to think through carefully the milestones, and you
need to think through the rules that will regulate the
milestones. We set up a commission, the commission we set up
and the law was passed by the apartheid government. So it’s
confidence building, step by step. And we’re taking small,
careful steps. But you can’t have a transition overnight. You
must think through the steps and go through them, because
they’re important for confidence building, for reassuring each
other that you are . . . it’s a little like, you know, first dinner,
and you start seeing each other, you know, and Starbucks coffee,
and then you move in, maybe you might move in, no you don’t
move in, you engage, but you need steps that reassure that
you’re on a good path, the wedding, and then forward to the
babies. So you need these steps. And it looks simple, but it’s
common sense actually, a place like Libya and Egypt, most of
those places have never taken a real deep breath and stopped,
and said “what do we need, and what are the milestones that will
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reassure everybody that we’re still on track?” I think we did that
rather well.
Gay McDougall: If I could just add here, the difference,
though, was that the old government had been convinced that it
had to go, and there was a long path to convincing it that it had
no option but to go. And that’s not been the case in Egypt and
Libya, and that’s been their problem; they didn’t have the time
to plan. In South Africa you all went through such extreme,
extraordinary measures of thinking through every little piece of
the way, because you had already convinced this government
that there was no future for it. Even the army, even the
generals—
Justice Moseneke: —that they would cooperate with us to
bring their demise, that they would cooperate with us to
terminate their rule.
But then, what it means and what you actually are saying is,
you have to visualize an end, and everybody must live with that
objective, everybody must say we’re moving there. And there
were challenges in the process, it’s not easy: whether or not to
indemnify the generals. It was a big, big issue. Many of the South
Africans today are not convinced that it was the right thing.
Whether or not to say anything at all in the Constitution about
property, for instance. Some people wanted nothing, no
property provisions, and we’ll sort it out later. Some people
wanted blanket protection of property acquired over the years.
It wasn’t easy, but the general objective was agreed to and we
took steps to achieve it.

